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DOES A PROMISE TO JOIN OR JOINING NATO IMPACT 
MILITARY SPENDING PATTERNS OF COUNTRIES 
 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to find similarities and analyze the changes in 
military spending (patterns and its structure) of the countries that joined the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the past 15 years. 
The thesis will address the following issues: 
1. Whether NATO membership, or a promise to join NATO, impact a 
country’s budgetary behavior and its defense resource allocation the same 
for all countries, or whether it differs by country, by examining changes in 
the spending structure five years before joining NATO and after joining 
NATO   
2. Determine if there are any common spending patterns among the countries  
The author will analyze the military expenditure data for Latvia, Lithuania, 
Estonia, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), cross comparing country data using quantitative 
analysis (correlation, R-square and comparison of means). The goal is to draw 
conclusions for whether the spending patterns and trends for the countries mentioned 
above are moving in the same directions. Does the percentage of GDP allocated for 
defense needs change in the same pattern for these countries? Are the spending patterns 
among groups of countries who joined NATO similar, or is there no evidence of change 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Alliances expand by the time-tested method of adding members who share the 
same interests and values. Forming and joining these alliances always demands some 
resources allocated from the countries who want to commit themselves to participation in 
them. Security, which results from defense, is not a free good in economic terms.  
As with all expenditures, defense expenditures involve a trade off of other goods 
and services, raising controversies about military versus social-welfare spending and 
whether defense is a benefit or burden to an economy.1 
The same can be said of the twelve countries that formed NATO in 1949—by 
signing the North Atlantic Treaty all countries agreed that:  
• They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and 
civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, 
individual liberty and the rule of law.  
• They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.2  
NATO expanded its membership and the alliance was joined by other countries 
who wanted to share this common feeling of security and to contribute to this trans-
Atlantic security system: Greece and Turkey (1952), West Germany (1955) and Spain 
(1982). In fact, the defense spending of NATO members represented their response to the 
perceived threat from the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact.3 
After the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the end of the Cold War the border 
and defense lines between the opposing sides were erased. But still countries from the 
former Warsaw Pact wanted to join NATO to share the perceived protection and benefits  
 
 
                                                 
1 Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler, The Economics of Defense Spending – An International Survey 
(Routledge, 1990), 1. 
2 The North Atlantic Treaty, (Washington, 1949), NATO website 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm (accessed May 20, 2008). 
3 Hartley and Sandler, The Economics of Defense Spending, 4. 
 2
of membership of the alliance as challenges arose. This later group included Hungary, the 
Czech Republic and Poland in 1999; and Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Bulgaria and Romania in 2004.  
This thesis only examines the similarities among country groups which are 
closely linked by entrance time to NATO (the Visegrad countries of Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic) or historical background (the Baltic countries of Latvia, Estonia, and 
Lithuania; and the Adriatic countries of Croatia, Albania, and FYROM). 
In order to examine similarities among the countries that joined NATO after the 
Cold War, the author will analyze: 
1. the changes in military expenditure structure of the countries (Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic) who joined NATO in 1999 after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union 
2. the changes in military expenditure structure of the Baltic States (Latvia, 
Estonia, and Lithuania) who joined NATO in the post 9/11 era 
3. the military spending patterns and trends of current and future NATO 
members, and NATO aspirants (Albania, Croatia and FYROM)  
The thesis will attempt to identify similarities among the military spending trends 
and patterns among each group of NATO entrants—did they experience the same 
resource shifting challenges? Secondly, the author will cross-compare the spending 
trends and patterns for similarities among all three groups of new NATO members and 
aspirant countries—are there any repeating patterns before and after official NATO 
membership, and if yes what are these patterns and what were the budgetary implications 
of those patterns? The thesis will draw conclusions on country military expenditure 
behavior before and after NATO membership.  
In addition, the thesis will analyze the changes in the behavior of these countries 
in the military procurement field—changes in the spending ratios among different 
spending categories such as personnel, equipment, infrastructure and other expenditures 





II.  PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will study how the military expenditure behavior of the NATO 
member and aspirant countries has changed on their way to full-fledged NATO 
membership in the different phases in relations with NATO; it will also investigate 
similarities (if any) among NATO member states that joined NATO at different time 
periods (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary in 1999; Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania in 
2004; and current NATO aspirants Albania, Croatia and FYROM). 
Quantitative research methodology with emphasis on statistical analysis will be 
used to find relationships among the countries’ military spending data using the following 
metrics—changes in the defense spending/gross domestic product relationship, changes 
in the defense spending structure by categories of the sample countries. The gathered data 
will be examined and interpreted, and generalizations made in order to make assumptions 
on future behavior of current NATO aspirants.  
The author will use military spending data available from the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute database on the countries’ military expenditures.4 
Information on the SIPRI definition of military expenditure can be found on the SIPRI 
website.5 
Data on country military expenditures and other information from the North 
Atlantic Treaty organizations official website6 will be used to determine the ratios among 
different spending positions such as personnel, equipment, infrastructure and other 
expenditures (according to the NATO spending data classification). 
 
                                                 
4 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute website, 
http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_definition.html (accessed May 20, 2008). 
5Ibid. 
6 NATO website, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/ (accessed May 20, 2008). 
 4
Also, Gross domestic product data for different years for the corresponding 
countries from the World Bank website7 will be used to complement the data sources 
mentioned above. 
                                                 
7 World Bank website, http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method= 
getMembers&userid=1&queryId=135 (accessed May 20, 2008). 
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III.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler describe the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
as follows: “NATO is a voluntary international club which specializes in providing 
collective defense (a public good). Nations will join the club and remain members so 
long as membership is expected to be worthwhile (benefits exceed costs).”8  It means that 
all countries who want to join the “club” expect that the benefits to be received will 
outweigh the costs which they will incur.  
But the problem is that an alliance built on the premise that all expect to benefit 
more (receive more security and stability) then they contribute will eventually collapse. 
That is why several countries are willing to over contribute—get less than they 
contributed—in order to achieve other certain intangible goals such as building trust and 
relationships, and expanding their influence and culture. 
NATO members contribute to the Alliance in various ways. The most significant 
means by far is through funding and the deployment of their respective armed forces in 
support of NATO missions.  
Over the past decade, as the alliance has undertaken enlargement, current 
member countries have been providing bilateral assistance to prospective 
future members. Defense analysts point out that the NATO allies also 
contribute to mutual security in many other ways.9 
Still, scholars like to see country contribution in monetary, military and 
measurable resource terms — to determine which countries are over contributing to the 
alliance and which countries are free riders. This is a new branch of economics; science 
and the theoretical basis for such research is usually no older than 20-30 years. 
Defense economics is a relatively new and expanding branch of 
economics. It involves the application of macro and micro economic 
                                                 
8 Hartley and Todd Sandler, “NATO Burden-Sharing: Past and Future,” Journal of Peace Research, 
1999, Vol. 36, No. 6, 665-680. 
9 Carl W. Ek, NATO Common Funds Burden sharing: Background and Current Issues, (Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress, 2006), 1. 
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theory to issues of defense, disarmament and peace. Studies of defense 
spending in different countries add to our limited knowledge in this 
developing field of economics.10   
As formulated by K. Hartley and Todd Sandler, in the model explaining the 
demand for military expenditure: 
ME = f (income (income factors which impact countries ME), spilling (spilling 
of demand for ME from other areas), threat (countries’ security situation), economic 
variables (economic factors, which impact countries’ development), political variables 
(countries’ internal and external political situation), dummies (other factors which could 
impact the demand for ME);11 it is clear that, when looking into country defense 
spending, it is very hard to isolate different aspects of the equation (political variables, 
dummies, threats).12 There are even more sub-variables we could add to the equation: 
climate, geographical location, alliance memberships, religion, etc. Therefore, measuring 
defense expenditure is a very complex issue and must be approached with caution.    
 A variety of indicators to measure burden sharing can be formulated and 
classified into the following categories: 
1. Military quantitative – size of the armed forces, population pool for 
conscription, number of military equipment available 
2. Military qualitative – quality of the armed forces, training, funding and 
readiness levels of the respective units, quality and effectiveness of the 
military equipment available to fulfill mission goals 
3. Civil quantitative – number of contributions to humanitarian mission, 
economic aid provided, assistance to refugees 
4. Civil qualitative indicators – quality of the help provided, impact and 
effectiveness of the contribution 
                                                 
10 Hartley and Sandler, The Economics of Defense Spending, xv. 
11 Ibid., 7. 
12 The author will use only budgetary and GDP data (income variable) to draw comparisons among 
countries, without taking into account other variables of the military expenditure equation:  ME = f 
(income, spilling, threat, economic variables, political variables, dummies).    
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The military indicators distinguish among expenditure, the components of defense 
budgets, national contributions to NATO, final outputs in the form of force effectiveness, 
and contributions to peacekeeping. Data on some of these indicators is not available in 
the public domain (e.g., force effectiveness).  
Where data are available, the spending levels on the various categories 
need to be placed in perspective. For example, contributions to NATO 
common funding (e.g. infrastructure) average less than 1% of total NATO 
defense spending: hence, over contributing to common funding does not 
make up for under contributing to defense, because common funding is so 
small.13 
The data may be analyzed with the following burden sharing metrics (methods): 
1. Defense spending as percent of GDP - relationship between military 
(defense) spending and national gross domestic product:  
This relationship is the most commonly used measure of defense burdens; 
however, it has limitations. Nations can differ in their definitions of defense spending 
(e.g., pensions, defense R&D), and some countries rely on conscript forces so that their 
defense budgets underestimate their defense burdens (as reflected in opportunity costs).14  
In addition, there are several more limitations on the usage of this measure of a nation’s 
contribution to defense spending:  
• Countries have different mixes of public and country-specific defense 
forces (nuclear and conventional forces and the geographical distribution 
of their conventional forces between home protection).15 
• Nations might apply the economic principle of substitution using 
alternative methods of providing protection, reflecting each nation’s 
comparative advantage in resources (e.g., equipment replacing manpower, 
nuclear forces replacing conventional forces).16  
• Differences are also likely to arise in the efficiency with which various 
nations convert defense expenditures into combat-effective armed forces.  
                                                 
13 Hartley and Sandler, “NATO Burden-Sharing: Past and Future,” 665.   
14 Ibid., 665.   
15 Ibid., 665.   
16 Ibid., 665.   
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• Some nations might have highly inefficient forces which would not be 
evident from D/GDP measures, although the impact on force effectiveness 
might be assessed by examining various components of the defense 
budget.17 
• Various quantitative indicators show the strength of a nation’s 
commitment to NATO as reflected in its willingness to support the 
alliance leader (e.g., basing and over flight rights for U.S. air raids on 
Libya).18 
2. Defense spending as percent of National budget - relationship between 
military spending and overall government spending 
3. Per capita Defense spending - relationship between military spending 
and a country’s population 
4. Defense spending per servicemen - relationship between military 
spending and the number of servicemen in each country. 
In order to analyze the similarities and differences between country military 
expenditure data the author will use defense spending (military expenditure) as percent of 
GDP in the development of this thesis.  
 
 
                                                 
17 Hartley and Sandler, “NATO Burden-Sharing: Past and Future,” 665.   
18 Ibid., 665.   
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IV.  ANALYSIS METHODS 
The gathered GDP and budgetary (income) data from the countries will be 
analyzed using  correlation analysis, R2 analysis  and the comparison of population means 
in order to see if there are any associations between the data sets and then to draw 
conclusions concerning possible relationships between the data sets. If some degree of 
relationship is there, then the author can make conclusions concerning the impact of 
NATO membership invitation and NATO membership on country military expenditure.  
A. CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
Correlation analysis is done to measure the degree of association or correlation 
that exists between two variables. The coefficient (r) of determination calculated for this 
purpose measures the strength of the relationship that exists between the two (or more) 
variables – military expenditure to GDP ratio data from two or more NATO aspirant and 
member countries. It assesses the proportion of variance in the dependent variable that 
has been accounted by the regression equation.19  
Main emphasis in correlation is the degree to which the linear model describes the 
relationship between two variables X and Y. The correlation coefficient (r) for a sample 








where x  and y are the sample means of X and Y, xs  and ys   are the sample standard 
deviations of X and Y. The sum is from i = 1 to n. The correlation coefficient may take 
on any value between plus and minus one:  
-1.00 ≤ r ≤ +1.00 
                                                 
19 Morris Hamburg, Basic Statistics: A Modern Approach (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc, 1974), 
237. 
 10
The sign of the correlation coefficient (+, -) defines the direction of the 
relationship, either positive or negative. A positive correlation coefficient means that as 
the value of one variable increases also the value of the other variable increases; 
conversely, as one decreases, the other decreases. A negative correlation coefficient 
indicates that as one variable increases, the other decreases, and vice-versa. The author 
expects to find positive and strong correlation between the country data sets in order to 
draw the conclusion that NATO membership invitation and NATO membership has 
influence on countries military expenditure increase and there is a common pattern in the 
military expenditure behavior between the countries who joined NATO in the last 15 
years and the countries who are invited to join and want to join NATO currently. 
Taking the absolute value of the correlation coefficient measures the strength of 
the relationship. A correlation coefficient of r=│0.50│ indicates a stronger degree of 
linear relationship than one of r= │0.40│. Likewise, a correlation coefficient of r=│-
0.50│ shows a greater degree of relationship than one of r=│0.40│. Thus, a correlation 
coefficient of zero (r=0.0) indicates the absence of a linear relationship and correlation 
coefficients of r=+1.0 and r=-1.0 indicate a perfect linear relationship.  
In addition, the correlation coefficient is a measure of the degree of closeness of 
the linear relationship between two variables. 
Two properties of r should be noted: 
1. r is a pure number without units or dimensions, because the scales of its 
numerator and denominator are both the products of the scales in which 
X1 and X2 are measured. One useful consequence is that r can be 
computed from coded values of X1 and X2. No decoding is required.  
2. r always lies between -1 and +1. Positive values of r indicate a tendency of 
X1 and X2 to increase together. When r is negative, large values of X1 are 
associated with small values of X2.20 
                                                 
20 George W. Snedecor and William G. Cochran, Statistical Methods, 6th ed. (The Iowa State 
University Press, 1974), 174. 
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The analysis will use also  R2   (squared coefficient of determination) to analyze 
the relationships between the military expenditure to GDP ratio data from the sample 
countries in order to sustain his assumption that NATO membership invitation and 
NATO membership has influenced country military spending behavior (R2 may be 
described as the proportion of the variance of Y that can be attributed to its linear 
regression on X, while (1-r2) is the proportion free from X)21.  
B. COMPARISON OF MEANS ANALYSIS 
This thesis will use the comparison between the population means (for each 
country ME expenditure data separately as for country groups – Visegrad, Baltic and 
Adriatic countries in general) in order to investigate the difference of the assumed 
military expenditure mean data of ME=2% of GDP (informal NATO requirement) and 
the real (sample) military expenditure data.  
This will give the author the opportunity to analyze whether the countries, as 
country groups, are committing to ME the NATO required 2% of GDP, or if they are not 
fulfilling this NATO informal requirement. 
This requirement is important, as the level of 2% of GDP committed to military 
expenditures is regarded as the proper level for a country to contribute to NATO 















                                                 
21 Snedecor and Cochran, Statistical Methods, 176. 
 12
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 13
V.  DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA GATHERING  
Data was gathered from available print and electronic sources. Data from the 
official NATO website (www.nato.int) was used to gather data on military spending 
categories and their ratios in military budgets for NATO member countries for the 
purposes of this thesis as also information on relationship history between corresponding 
countries and NATO was gathered. 
Official defense ministry websites of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Spain, 
Albania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was used to gather 
information concerning the development of the armed forces of the corresponding 
countries. 
Scientific, statistical and research publications on economic development data 
(GDP changes in percent) of countries was obtained from the World Bank website 
(www.worldbank.org ).  
In addition the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (www.sipri.org ) 
database of country military expenditures (until year 2006) was used to draw comparison 
between country military expenditures and form conclusion about possible associations in 
the data samples – all ME data is in the  format used by the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (U.S. dollars of 2005). GDP data for 2006 was drawn from 
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VI.  EMPIRICAL STUDY 
A. NATO ENLARGEMENT PROCESS 
1. General Principles 
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state 
in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the 
security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Article 10, The 
North Atlantic Treaty Washington DC, 4 April 1949  
Since 1949, the number of NATO member countries has increased from twelve 
NATO founding countries to 26 following two post-Cold-War enlargements. The Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland joined the Alliance in March 1999, following an invitation 
issued at the 1997 Madrid Summit Meeting; while Latvia, Estonia Bulgaria, Romania, 
Slovenia, Lithuania and Slovakia joined in 2004, after receiving the invitation at the 2002 
Prague Summit Meeting.22  
Already since the Washington Summit Meeting in April 1999 NATO 
leaders underlined the continuing openness of the Alliance to further new 
members and pledged that NATO would continue to welcome new 
members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute 
to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.23  
Even after these large accessions — which more than doubled the original number 
of members — NATO continues to adhere to the openness policy adopted in 1999; the 
member states agreed that NATO enlargement is an ongoing process, not a single 
event.24  
                                                 
22 Jim Garamone, “NATO Invites Seven Nations to Join,” Defense Link Website, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=42466 (accessed May 20, 2008). 
23 “The Process of NATO Enlargement,” NATO website, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0301.htm (accessed May 20, 2008). 
24 “The 1995 Study on NATO's Enlargement,” NATO website, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030101.htm (accessed May 20, 2008). 
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Several other countries have expressed their willingness to join NATO and begun 
NATO accession preparation procedures for full fledged membership: Albania, Croatia 
and FYROM. To facilitate an easier accession of the new members into NATO the 
alliance has developed specific tools to accommodate a smooth introduction of the new 
members into the alliance. 
In order to better facilitate the smooth transition to NATO requirements 
NATO is using the MAP (Membership Action Plan) which is specifically 
designed to provide advice and feedback to countries aspiring to join.25 
 
Table 1.   New NATO members (since 1999) and aspirants and NATO accession 
mechanisms (From: NATO) 
Country Partnership for Peace Membership Action 
Plan 
Joined NATO 
Poland 1994 - 1999 
Hungary 1994 - 1999 
Czech Republic 1994 - 1999 
Latvia 1994 1999 2004 
Lithuania 1994 1999 2004 
Estonia 1994 1999 2004 
Albania 1994 2002 Invited in 2008, will 
join in 2009 
Croatia 2000 2002 Invited in 2008, will 
join in 2009 
FYROM 1995 1999 Not invited to join, 
until official name 
issues with Greece 
are solved 
 
2. The 1995 Study on NATO's Enlargement 
At the Brussels Summit in 1994, NATO leaders reaffirmed that NATO still has an 
open door policy to other European states if they are ready to follow the principles of the 
                                                 
25 “The Process of NATO Enlargement.”  
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Washington Treaty and to contribute to security in the North Atlantic area. Building on 
this, in December 1994 Alliance Foreign Ministers determined the “why and how” 
criteria of future admissions into the Alliance, which were examined by the Allies during 
1995.26  
A study was completed after the meeting and the resulting “Study on NATO 
Enlargement” was shared with interested Partner countries in September 1995 and made 
public. The guidelines given in this study are still applicable to NATO enlargements 
today.  
The reason for conducting the study was to answer the question of why NATO 
should expand after the end of the Cold War; the answer was that there is still a need for 
and a unique opportunity to build improved security in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic 
area, without re-creating dividing lines.27 In addition, NATO is facing more global 
threats now and new members can assist in NATO’s peacekeeping efforts. 
The study concluded the following: 
1. NATO will remain a defensive Alliance. 
2. NATO will encourage and support democratic reforms, including the 
establishment of civilian and democratic control over military forces. 
3. NATO will increase transparency in defense planning and military 
budgets, thereby reinforcing confidence among states, and will reinforce 
the tendency toward integration and cooperation in Europe. 
4. Furthermore, NATO will strengthen the Alliance’s ability to contribute to 
European and international security and support peacekeeping under the 
United Nations or OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe); and it will strengthen and broaden the transatlantic partnership.28  
                                                 




New members will be accepted according to the Article 10 prerequisites and they 
will become full-fledged members after completing certain procedures and fulfilling 
certain benchmarks. At the same time countries must conform to all NATO requirements 
in practice and not only on paper - they must have real capabilities. Countries that have 
internal or external disputes (democracy issues, unsolved border disputes etc.) should 
solve them by peaceful means before becoming members.  
Ultimately, the Study concluded, Allies would decide by consensus 
whether to invite each new member to join, basing their decision on their 
judgment - at the time such a decision has to be made - of whether the 
membership of a specific country would contribute to security and 
stability in the North Atlantic area or not. No country outside the Alliance 
has a veto or ‘droit de regard’ over the process of enlargement or decisions 
relating to it.29  
3. Mechanisms of Enlargement 
Analyzing both NATO enlargements after the end of the Cold War and also the 
current enlargement procedure, some scholars offer the following five stages to define the 
enlargement procedure:  
1. Development of military cooperation with the given country under the 
auspices of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative 
2. A step-up in PfP cooperation that may include an implicit or explicit 
formulation of aspiration to membership by the given country and actions 
within PfP to advance that goal 
3. Consensus-building within NATO regarding the given country’s eligibility 
for consideration for membership, crowned with NATO’s open 
recognition of the aspiration 
4. Detailed scrutiny of the pros and cons of the country’s potential accession 
and discussion of the country’s shortcomings in meeting membership pre-
conditions 
5. Intra- alliance bargaining as to when the country will be invited to join.30 
                                                 
29 “The Process of NATO Enlargement.” 
30 Thomas S. Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015 Determinants and Implications for Defense 
Planning and Shaping (Rand Corporation, 2001), 44. 
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Stage one of the accession procedure is basically the expression of the countries 
wish to join NATO and the realignment of common defense and security directions. Each 
country is making the statement that its security and defense priorities are aligned with 
NATO’s security and defense priorities. This step is one of the easiest, but there are cases 
when countries had not received the “green light” from NATO – like Croatia was not 
able to join PfP until May 2000, when the government started an internal democratization 
process.31  
Partnership for Peace (PfP) is an important initiative introduced by NATO at the 
January 1994 Brussels Summit Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The aim of the 
Partnership is to enhance stability and security throughout Europe.32 NATO addressed 
the PfP Invitation to all states participating in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) and also to other states participating in the Conference for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE) who were interested, able and of course 
willing to contribute to this partnership among countries promoting initiative.  
The invitation has since been accepted by a total of 33 countries.33 The accession 
to the Alliance of the ten former PfP countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia) brings the current 
number of PfP participants to 23.34   
The activities which each Partner undertakes in relations to NATO and other 
Partner countries are based on jointly (NATO – country) elaborated Individual 
Partnership Programs. The PfP programs main focuses is  on defense-related cooperation, 
but it also goes beyond dialogue and cooperation in the military and defense field in order  
to forge real partnerships between Partner countries and NATO.35  
                                                 
31 Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 44. 




35 “Partnership for Peace,” NATO website, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030201.htm 
(accessed May 20, 2008). 
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 Stage two of the accession procedure signals that the country is ready to develop 
and strengthen its relationship to NATO, which could result in a full fledged NATO 
membership. But this is not always the case (as countries do not always desire to become 
NATO members); for example Switzerland has been active in non-military PfP activities 
for years, thus signaling its desire to cooperate with other countries, but not to join 
NATO36. 
 Stage three is the mid point of the accession procedure when the military 
cooperation grows into an eventual membership to NATO. In Stage two, a country can 
state that it wants to join NATO, but in Stage three the ball is on the NATO side and it is 
the NATO side that declares the intent to accept or not a country in the alliance; since 
1999 the tool for declaring such intent is the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process, 
which helps to transform the vision of NATO membership into reality – if a country has 
started this process there is a certain probability of full fledged NATO membership in 
future.  
 MAP process was started in April 1999 to assist those countries (mostly those 
countries that joined NATO in 2004) who wish to join the Alliance in their preparations 
by providing advice, assistance and practical support on all aspects of NATO 
membership. Its main features are: 
• the submission by aspiring members of individual annual national 
programs on their preparations for possible future membership, covering 
political, economic, defense, resource, security and legal aspects  
• a focused and candid feedback mechanism on aspirant countries' progress 
on their programs that includes both political and technical advice, as well 
as annual 19+1(now 26+1) meetings at Council level to assess progress  
• a clearing house to help coordinate assistance by NATO and by member 
states to aspirant countries in the defense/military field  
• a defense planning approach for aspirants which includes elaboration and 
review of agreed planning targets37  
                                                 
36 Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 44. 
37 “The Membership Action Plan,” NATO website, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030103.htm (accessed May 20, 2008). 
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Aspirant countries are expected to achieve certain goals not only in the military 
field but also in the political and economic fields. These non military goals include 
different political and economic activities including, but not limited to  - settling any 
international, ethnic or external territorial disputes by peaceful means; demonstrating a 
commitment to the rule of law and human rights; establishing democratic control of their 
armed forces; and promoting stability and well-being through economic liberty, social 
justice and environmental responsibility38.  
Of course countries military capabilities and readiness - which is captured in the 
defense and military activity list in the MAP focus on the ability of the country to 
contribute to collective defense and to the Alliance’s new missions – is the new member 
bringing added value to the alliance (is a contributor) or just wants to harvest the benefits 
provided by the NATO membership.  
Full participation in PfP is an essential component, because through their 
individual PfP programs which specifically include goals for each country, aspirants can 
focus on essential membership related issues. Partnership Goals for aspirants include 
planning targets covering those areas which are most directly relevant for nations aspiring 
to NATO membership.39 
Resource issues focus on the need for any aspirant country to commit sufficient 
resources to defense to allow them to meet the commitments that future membership 
would bring in terms of collective NATO undertakings.40  
Security issues center on the need for aspirant countries to make sure that 
procedures are in place to ensure the security of sensitive information.  
Legal aspects address the need for aspirants to ensure that legal arrangements and 
agreements which govern cooperation within NATO are compatible with domestic 
legislation.41 
                                                 





Placing a country in this (third) stage of the NATO accession process is usually 
done by a public statement from the NATO side. There are several examples (Ukraine, 
Finland) where because of different reasons active participation in Stage 2 activities does 
not guarantee the move to the next stage – phase four of the accession procedure.42  
 Stage four starts when the countries’ aspiration efforts are recognized by NATO 
and the intra alliance discussion on the countries’ weaknesses starts. Countries then are 
evaluated compared to the criteria listed in the 1995 NATO Enlargement study – do they 
fulfill them or no.  
 Then in multilateral as bilateral meetings, at various levels, between the aspirant 
and NATO country representatives a schedule is agreed for the country specific MAP 
process – to correct certain weaknesses before NATO accession in order to be seen as a 
qualified candidate for membership. When the minimum requirements are met, the 
accession process goes to its final stage. 
Stage five is the final stage of the NATO accession process where the country 
receives an official invitation to join NATO — of course, such an invitation can be 
achieved only after an intra-alliance bargaining procedure, and consensus recognition 
among NATO members that the aspirant country has fulfilled Stage 4 minimum 
requirements and is ready to join NATO.43 
B. COUNTRY ANALYSIS 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter of the thesis the historical and economic background of each of the 
NATO member countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Latvia, Estonia and 
Lithuania) mentioned in this paper, as well as the historical background of the countries 
who were invited to join NATO in 2009 (Croatia and Albania) will be reviewed. The  
 
                                                 
42 Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 44. 
43 Ibid., 44. 
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background of FYROM, which was not invited to join NATO in 2009, will also be 
reviewed. The development of ME trends in these countries after the end of the Cold War 
will be discussed. 
2. Poland (1999) 
After the Second World War, Poland hoped to get back its independence, but was 
occupied by the Red Army; this led to establishment of a pro-Soviet regime in Poland 
which lasted until 1989, when the first free elections in postwar Poland were held and 
democratic forces triumphed. 
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Poland, which was a founding member of 
the Warsaw Pact (Treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance) in 1955,44 
wanted to leave the Soviet sphere of influence and in 1991 stated its interest to join 
NATO.45 
 To gain faster admittance to NATO, Poland joined the PfP program in 1994 (five 
years prior to NATO membership) to modernize its armed forces according to NATO 
standards. In 1999, Poland joined the North Atlantic Treaty organization. 
 Poland joined NATO at a difficult time — the Alliance was facing major changes 
and challenges: enlargement, new threats, new missions, new technology, and declining 
defense budgets.46  
a.  Background Information on the Armed Forces of Poland 
During the Cold War, the Polish armed forces were second in size only to 
the USSR in the Warsaw Pact, numbering 897,000 (406,000 active and 491,000 reserves) 
in 1988; that number dropped to 731,500 (296,500 active and 435,000 reserves) in 
                                                 
44 “Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance,” Fordham University website, 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1955warsawpact.html (accessed May 20, 2008). 
45 “Poland in NATO,” Warsaw Voice website, http://www2.warsawvoice.pl/old/v542/nato/n7.htm 
(accessed May 20, 2008). 
46  Hartley and Sandler, “NATO Burden-Sharing: Past and Future,” 665.   
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1992.47 This huge decrease can be explained by the fact that the Ministry of National 
Defense (MoND) cut forces as fast as possible.  
To accommodate these huge changes in the personnel strength, the Polish 
armed forces and General Staff have been under constant reform and reorganization since 
the early 1990s, when the Cold War ended. International operations within NATO and 
the EU are the key drivers for force development. Poland's military has almost halved 
since the end of the Warsaw Pact, under the terms of a 1991 plan.48  
Currently the Polish military conscripts 67,500 persons annually (around 
40 per cent of the total number of the personnel) and plans are there to reduce the number 
of conscripts to 58,500 by 2008, when it is intended that at least 60 per cent of military 
personnel will be volunteers. 
Poland wants to increase the share of volunteers in the armed forces to  65 
percent in 2010. In addition Poland has already amended the conscript service time in the 
armed forces – it has decreased since 2005, from 12 to 9 months.   
The drive toward fully professional armed forces should be complete in 
2012, when conscription will be suspended. Ministry of National Defense plans state that 
2,180 professional privates are to be assigned to 11 army units, 250 to 28 air force and 
air-defense units and 450 to the navy. Another 180 should be serving with military police 
and intelligence units.49 
b.  Spending Before NATO 
After the end of the Cold War, Poland was left with a broken economy 
and huge armed forces and was in urgent need of military transformation.50 A vital need 
                                                 
47 “Poland’s Armed Forces,” Website Based on the Country Studies Series by Federal Research 
Division of the Library of Congress, http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-10798.html (accessed 
May 20, 2008). 
48 Christian Le Miére, Sentinel, Security Assessment - Central Europe And The Baltic States (Jane’s 
Defense Review, 2007).  
49 Le Miére, Sentinel, Security Assessment - Central Europe And The Baltic States. 
50 “Poland’s Armed Forces.” 
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for the newly democratic country was to decrease the portion of military expenditures in 
the state budget and as a portion of the GDP. 
Therefore, it is likely to find a big decrease in military spending for Poland 
after the Cold War — from 1990 to 1991 alone the decrease was 1,847 million dollars or 
31.7%. These expenditure cuts also came with large cuts in the number of military 
personnel.  
But after 1994, it is possible to see a gradual increase in Polish military 
expenditures in terms of dollars spent, because Poland joined the PfP initiative as a 
stepping stone to NATO membership, the declared target since 1991. 
 
Table 2.   Amount (million 2005 $) military expenditures of Poland (From: SIPRI) 


































































The percentage of GDP spent on the military drops significantly after the 
end of the Cold War – there is no need for such large armed forces anymore in a 
struggling economy – due to transition to a free market economy. 
Then in 1992 the military expenditure increases again — probably (as 
discussed above) due to the expressed political will of Poland to join NATO and also due 
to Polish participation in PfP beginning in 1994,  
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Since 1995, Poland has been holding military expenditures to about 2% of 
GDP (the informal NATO requirement for member states) GDP. 
 
Table 3.   Amount (%GDP) military expenditures of Poland (From: SIPRI) 


























































Poland has actually decreased its spending as percentage of GDP starting 
from the year 1999, though in actual dollars the expenditures are increasing. This can be 
explained by the fact that during the 1990s Poland experienced very fast economic 
growth and development, thus growing its GDP . 
 
Table 4.   Poland’s GDP percent change 1990 -2006 (From: World Bank data) 










































































c.  Spending After Joining NATO 
After Poland joined NATO in 1999, the contribution in terms of percent of 
GDP spent for military needs decreased; in 1998 Poland spent 2% of GDP for military 
needs, but thereafter until 2003 it was never higher than 1.9% of GDP. 
Also, in fiscal terms there was a decrease of military expenditures after 
1998 (the year prior to accession to NATO), with the 1998 level of $5,073 million 
(according to SIPRI data) not reached again until 2002, due to Poland’s strong support of 
the U.S. in the War on Terror.  
3.  Czech Republic (1999) 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Czech Republic was among the most 
eager countries to flee the influence sphere of Russia as early as possible to join NATO 
and the European Union. Lodged firmly in the memory of the population was 1968, when 
an invasion by Warsaw Pact troops ended the efforts of the country's leaders to liberalize 
Communist Party rule and create "socialism with a human face".51   
The Czech Republic was the larger of two countries to emerge from the breakup 
of the former Czechoslovakia on 1 January 1993; this so called "velvet divorce" formed 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia. A year later, the Czech Republic joined the European 
Union,52 and in 1999, NATO. As with other former Eastern bloc countries during the 
1990s, the Czech Republic struggled to adapt its economy to the new situation; most 
countries found it a hard transition from socialist to market economy. 
a.  Background Information on the Czech Armed Forces 
During the last years of the Warsaw Pact there were approximately 
201,000 personnel on active duty in the CSLA (Czechoslovak People's Army) in 1987, 
                                                 
51 ”Czech Republic Fact Book,” CIA website, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ez.html (accessed May 20, 2008). 
52 Ibid. 
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about 145,000 (72%) of whom served in the ground forces (commonly referred to as the 
army). Of these, about 100,000 were conscripts.53  
But the Czech military underwent several transformation procedures in the 
90s; personnel end-strength was cut from 106,101 in 1991 to 67,702 (excluding civilians) 
in 1995.54  This was done in response to NATO admission requirements. In 1994, the 
Czech Republic joined the Partnership for Peace Program, which helped the Czech armed 
forces to adopt NATO procedures and NATO standards, increased interoperability with 
NATO forces. The Czech Republic completed its accession talks and became a NATO 
member, together with Hungary and Poland, on 12 March 1999.  
However, the armed forces remained bigger than necessary for the new 
situation. For instance, in 1997 the Defense Ministry still employed more than 80,000 
persons (24,000 of whom were civilians), or 25,000 more than planned in the first reform 
concept approved in 1993. In addition, between 1996 and 1998, a number of measures 
implemented according to various lower-level doctrinal documents, army development 
concepts and acquisition plans were made in a conceptual vacuum. This was because 
older, high-level strategic documents were no longer valid and new reviews were only 
approved at the beginning of 1999.55 
The low speed of military reforms can be traced back to the fact that, 
during the early-to-late 90s, the main priority of the government was the improvement of 







                                                 
53 “Czech Republic Armed Forces,” Website Based on the Country Studies Series by Federal Research 
Division of the Library of Congress, http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-3751.html (accessed 
May 20, 2008). 
54 Vassil Danov,Comparative Analysis of the Reforms in the Armies of the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Bulgaria during 1990 – 1998 Period (NATO Research Fellowship Program, 2001), Fig I/1. 
55 Jiri Sedivy, “Czech Military Transformation: An Analysis,” Military Technology, vol. 29, no. 5, 
2005, 33-40. 
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Table 5.   Czech Republic GDP growth % 1990 – 2007 (From: World Bank Data) 



































































Even the national security and military strategy review, approved a few 
weeks before the public joining of NATO in March 1999, largely ignored opportunities -  
such as identifying niches and focusing on developing specialized, higher-value-added 
capabilities for the Alliance’s multinational forces. Only after the 2002 Prague Summit 
did this change.  
In summer 2001, the government approved terms of reference for what 
was supposed to be the last major reform of the Czech Army—a shift toward a 
professional force in the beginning of 2005.56 Reductions in armed forces personnel 
strength continued and in 2006 the Czech army had the size of 26,000 military 
personnel.57 
b.  Spending Before NATO 
After the end of the Cold War, the Czech Republic was left with large 
armed forces which needed to be transformed in order to be sustainable.  
                                                 
56 “Professional Army,” Czech Ministry of Defense website, 
http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=5762 (accessed May 20, 2008). 
57 “NATO – Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defense for 2006,” 
NATO website, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-159.pdf (accessed May 20, 2008). 
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As mentioned earlier, given the pressing fiscal situation of the countries’ 
militaries, expenditure was not a priority of the government until 1998—one year prior to 
NATO accession. This was the first year in the 1990s when defense military expenditures 
increased compared to the previous year, from 1.7% of the GDP to 1.9% of the GDP. 
 
Table 6.   Czech Republic military expenditure as % of GDP 1994 – 2003 (From: 
SIPRI) 
 
Czech Republic ME as % GDP
2.3
1.9 1.8 1.7




















c.  Spending After Joining NATO 
After joining NATO in 1999, the Czech Republic was one of the few new 
members who continued to commit resources at around 2% GDP to ME (2% of GDP in 
1999, 2000 and 2002 and 2.1% of the GDP in 2003).  
After 2003, a decline of the military expenditure commitment can be 
noticed—1.9% of GDP in 2004 and 1.8% in 2005. Probably one of the reasons behind 
this decrease is the shift of government priorities to mitigate the damages caused to the 
country by flooding in summer 2002.58 
 
 
                                                 
58 Prague Post website, http://www.praguepost.com/P02/2002/20814/news1.php (accessed May 20, 
2008). 
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Table 7.   Czech Republic military expenditure in million $ (2005) 1994 – 2003 
(From: SIPRI) 
Czech Republic ME in $(2005,millions)





















4. Hungary (1999) 
In 1956 Hungary, which like the rest of Eastern Europe fell under the communist 
rule against which Hungary revolted, announced its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. 
This announcement was met with a massive military intervention by Moscow. But after 
that, the Hungarian government under the leadership of Janos Kadar in 1968 was allowed 
to liberalize its economy—introducing so-called "Goulash Communism."59  
In 1990, Hungary held its first multiparty elections and started the transition to a 
free market economy, joining the European Union in 1994. 
The fact that “Goulash Communism” was already in place since the 70s helped 
the country to smoothen the economic transition and there was not as much economic 




                                                 
59 “Hungary Fact Book,” CIA website, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/hu.html (accessed May 20, 2008). 
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Table 8.   Hungary GDP growth % 1990 – 2007 (From: World Bank data) 






























































Within four years of the collapse of communism, nearly half of the country's 
economic enterprises had been transferred to the private sector, and by 1998 Hungary 
was attracting nearly half of all foreign direct investment in its region.60 In 1999, 
Hungary joined NATO, together with Poland and the Czech Republic. 
a.  Background Information on the Armed Forces of Hungary 
During the Cold War, the Hungarian armed forces were one of the 
smallest in the Warsaw Pact—approximately 100,000 personnel were on active duty in 
the Hungarian Peoples Army in 1988, of which about 64,000 were conscripts (excluding 
civilian personnel).61 One of the main reasons behind this fact was that 200,000 Soviet 
Army troops were stationed in the country, filling many of Hungary’s defense needs by 
their presence. Hungary ranked last, along with Bulgaria and Romania, in the number of 
military helicopters, and only Romania had fewer tanks.  
                                                 
60 “Country Profile Hungary,” BBC website, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/1049641.stm, (accessed May 20, 2008). 
61 “Hungarian Armed Forces,” Website Based on the Country Studies Series by Federal Research 
Division of the Library of Congress, http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-5939.html (accessed 
May 20, 2008). 
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During the last decade, the Hungarian army underwent a transformation 
that cut its armed forces from 121,600 (including 27,600 civilians) to 74,463 (including 
17,115) in 1996.62 
Hungary finished its armed forces transformation in 2004, switching to a 
professional military at a current level of 23,000 personnel.63  
b.  Spending Before NATO 
As mentioned before, Hungary’s transition to a market economy in the 
early 90s was easier than it had been for neighboring countries, but as had a relatively 
ineffective force compared to other former Warsaw Pact countries, more investment was 
needed to rebuild the Hungarian armed forces. 
Therefore, Hungary spent more than 2.1% of GDP on military 
expenditures until 1994, when it joined PfP; but thereafter, military spending never again 
reached 2% of GDP.  
 
Table 9.   Hungary military expenditure as % of GDP 1994 – 2003 (From: SIPRI) 
























                                                 
62 Vassil Danov,Comparative Analysis of the Reforms in the Armies of the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Bulgaria during 1990 – 1998 Period, Fig I/1Fig II/1. 
63 “NATO – Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defense for 2006,” 
NATO website, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-159.pdf (accessed May 20, 2008). 
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Hungary increased its military spending prior to accession to NATO in 
1998, from 1.5% of GDP in 1998 to 1.7% of GDP in 1999. In fiscal terms, the increase 
was from $1.21 to $1.40 billion. 
c.  Spending After Joining NATO 
After joining NATO in 1999, the Hungarian commitment to military 
expenditure was 1.7–1.8% of GDP for the years 1999–2003; it then dropped to 1.5% in 
2004 and 2005. 
 
Table 10.   Hungary military expenditure as % of GDP 1994 – 2003 (From: SIPRI)  






























When reviewing the military expenditure commitment from the fiscal 
perspective, it is possible to see that there was a continuous increase of funds from 1998 
to 2001, from $1.21 to $1.66 billion. After that, military expenditures took a hit, as in 
2006 the funding level of $1.353 billion returned to the funding level of 1997 ($1.350 
billion). 
5.  Baltic Countries (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania) 
The Baltic countries have always been at the crossroads of interests of major 
countries in Europe—Russia and Germany in recent memory, Poland and Sweden in 
previous centuries.  
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They became independent states for the first time after the collapse of the Russian 
Empire in 1918. Then the countries enjoyed a brief spell of independence which lasted 
for 22 years; this period was ended by Soviet occupation in 1940, an occupation that 
lasted until the USSR’s collapse in 1991. 
After the collapse of the USSR, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania sought an 
international mechanism which would provide them safety and security. All three 
countries declared membership in NATO and EU to be a primary goal of their foreign 
policies and planned to join as early as possible.  
But it was a long road for the Baltic countries to travel, as 50 years of Soviet 
occupation had left scars on the economies of the three countries and their readiness to 
take security related responsibilities in the international area.  
In order to make the accession to both organizations harder, Russia stated its 
opposition to the membership of the three Baltic countries in the EU and NATO 
(especially NATO); this made the issue of accession not only dependent on the success of 
the reforms and progress done by the countries, but also on political bargaining and 
negotiation among Russia, NATO and EU officials at the highest levels.   
a.  Latvia (2004) 
1)  Background Information on the Latvian Armed Forces. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Latvia had no defense forces; so there was 
a need to build a new defense system from scratch. This system had its beginnings back 
in 1991 during the Days of the Barricades (as the Soviet government tried to oppress 
freedom movements in the Baltic republics with force).  
On 24 January 1991, the Public Security Department was 
established, but the specific defense institutions began to form after the real restoration of 
independence.64 The first step was the establishment of the Ministry of Defense in 
                                                 
64 “Latvian Independence Restoration and Establishment of Defense Structures,” MoD Latvia website, 
http://www.mod.gov.lv/Ministrija/Vesture/Latvijas%20neatkaribas%20atjaunosana%20un%20aizsardzibas
%20strukturu%20izveide%20(1991).aspx (accessed May 20, 2008). 
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November 1991 and development of the first draft structure of the armed forces. At this 
time other institutions, such as the State Defense Forces, the National Academy of 
Defense and other entities related to state defense, were subordinated directly to the 
Ministry of Defense.65  
Until 1994, the Latvian armed forces totaled 6,600 soldiers, 
including 1,650 in the army, 630 in the navy, 180 in the air force, and 4,140 in the border 
guard. Plans called for 9,000 active members in the armed forces. In addition, the security 
service of the Ministry of Interior and the reserve Home Guard—totaling 17,000 
members—served as a national guard and assisted the border guard and the police.66 
A conscript based system was established where during a 15-year 
period (until 2007)—40,718 soldiers served in the armed forces. Latvia revised the 
National Defense Concept in 2003, changing from territorial defense with a conscript 
base to an all-volunteer force with the main focus on participation in collective defense. 
The changes in the armed forces were implemented for several reasons: 
1. NATO membership and participation of Latvian armed forces in NATO 
operations 
2. A need to improve Latvia’s host-nation capabilities 
3. Changes in the international situation: there was no need for territorial 
defense forces and Latvia shifted its focus to developing its force 
components for NATO forces 
4. Allocation of funds: taking into account the opportunity costs of conscript-
based armed forces, it was decided to use more efficient, well-equipped 
professional units  
The transition to a fully professional force of approximately 5,000 
soldiers was finished in 2007.67 
 
                                                 
65 “Latvian Independence Restoration and Establishment of Defense Structures.” 
66 “Latvia, National Security,” Library of Congress Country Studies website, 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field (DOCID+lv0029) (accessed May 20, 2008). 
67 “Latvian National Armed Forces Structure and Tasks,” MoD Latvia website, 
http://www.mod.gov.lv/Nacionalie%20brunotie%20speki/NBS%20Struktura.aspx (accessed May 20, 
2008). 
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2) Spending before NATO.  After regaining independence in 
1991, Latvia started from scratch. All the Baltic countries were in transition from a 
planned to a market based economy.  Latvia’s economy experienced a shift in the import 
and export direction of goods—the former export market to the USSR collapsed as the 
import of raw materials from former compatriots was not possible anymore. 
After the collapse of the USSR, Latvia’s economic growth stopped 
for four years until 1994, but still Latvia needed to increase spending for military 
purposes to develop its armed forces.  
In 1994, Latvia joined the PfP framework in order to improve its 
interoperability with NATO forces; the PfP goals served as a roadmap to NATO, Latvia’s 
ultimate security goal. 
 
Table 11.   Latvia GDP growth % 1990 – 2006 (From: World Bank data) 



































































In order to achieve its goal, Latvia started to increase its military 
spending in the first years of independence—from $ 61.7 million in 1993 to $71.9 million 
in 1994, according to SIPRI data.  
After the accession to the PfP dialogue, Latvia’s military 
expenditure decreased at the start, but then increased gradually after 1996.   
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Table 12.   Latvia military expenditure as % of GDP 1997 – 2006 (From: SIPRI) 
 




























To stress further to NATO its willingness to join after accessing 
the MAP process in 1999, Latvia drastically increased its spending after 2000, from $91.6 
million in 2000 to $188 million in 2002—an increase of 205%.  
Also, in terms of % of GDP, Latvia made a huge jump in 2000, 
from 0.9% of GDP to 1.6% of GDP in 2002. 
 
Table 13.   Latvia, amount of military expenditure in million $ (2005) 1997 – 2006 
(From: SIPRI) 
 





























3) Spending after Joining NATO.  Until accession to NATO 
in 2004, Latvia never reached the required commitment of 2% of GDP for military 
expenditures, as can be seen from SIPRI data. Latvia came closest to the 2% hurdle in 
2003, 2004 and 2005, spending 1.7% of GDP for military purposes, but as GDP growth 
for the same years was substantial in terms of fiscal growth the numbers look better: $217 
million in 2003, $234 million in 2004 (Latvia’s accession year to NATO) and $274 
million in 2005. 
Latvia continues to increase its spending for military purposes, 
reaching $308 million in 2007.  
b. Estonia (2004) 
1) Background Information on the Armed Forces of Estonia.  
Estonia mirrored the other post-USSR Baltic countries in the need to rebuild its armed 
forces from scratch. The government took swift measures to build up its defense forces, 
so much so that already by 1994 the Estonian Defense Forces numbered about 3,000 
(including a 2,500-member army and a 500-member navy).  
There was also a 6,000-member reserve militia, known as the 
Defense League (Kaitseliit); a 2,000-member paramilitary border guard under the 
command of the Ministry of Interior; and a maritime border guard, which also functioned 
as a coast guard.68  
To further stress the importance of national defense, the Estonian 
parliament in March 1994 adopted a law mandating 8-12 months of military service for 
all male citizens aged 19-27 years. 
In 2006, Estonia reported to NATO armed forces strength of 5,000 
military personnel,69 but currently the average size of the Estonian Regular Armed Forces 
in peacetime is about 3,800 (Army 3,300, Navy 300, and Air Force 200) persons, of 
                                                 
68 “Estonia, National Security,” Library of Congress Country Studies website, 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field (DOCID+ee0027) (accessed May 20, 2008). 
69 “NATO – Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defense for 2006,” 
NATO website, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-159.pdf (accessed May 20, 2008). 
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whom about 1,500 are conscripts. The Voluntary Defense League also has about 8,000 
members. The planned size of the operational (wartime) structure is 16,000 personnel.70 
2) Spending before NATO.  Estonia spent $36.7 million on its 
military in 1992, in order to start up the rebuilding of the Estonian Defense Forces. 
As with other former Soviet bloc countries, Estonia faced big 
budgetary constraints on increasing military expenditure during the first five years of 
independence, as only in 1995 did its economy finally start to grow. 
 
Table 14.   Estonia, GDP growth % 1990 – 2006 (From: World Bank data)  





































































Estonia joined PfP in 1994, and thereby gaining specific 
partnership goals which needed to be accomplished before talks on possible NATO 
membership could start.  
Starting from 1994, Estonia spent more then 1% of GDP on 
military expenditures, but as with Latvia and Lithuania never committed to spend 2% of 
GDP on military expenditure—the closest it came was in the years 2003 and 2004 
(Estonia’s year of accession to NATO) when military expenditures reached 1.8% of 
GDP. 
                                                 
70 “What are the Estonian Defense Forces,” Estonian MoD website, http://www.mil.ee/index_eng.php 
(accessed May 20, 2008). 
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Table 15.   Estonia military expenditure as % of GDP 1997 – 2006 (From: SIPRI) 
 
























But in analyzing military spending in fiscal terms, it is possible to 
see that the budget grew gradually since 1995, topped $200 million in 2003 and has 
remained over $200 million since.  
 
Table 16.   Estonia, amount of military expenditure in  million  $ (2005) 1997 – 2006 
(From: SIPRI) 



























3) Spending after Joining NATO.  After entering NATO in 
2004, Estonia decreased spending for military expenditures from 1.8% to 1.5% of GDP, 
which was also reflected in fiscal terms (from $213 million in 2003 to $204 million in 
2004).  
c.  Lithuania (2004) 
1) Background Information on the Armed Forces of Lithuania.  
After restoration of independence on 11 March 1990, one of the major priorities of the 
Lithuanian government was re-establishment of the armed forces as Soviet army forces 
deployed in Lithuania (approx. 34,600 troops)71 withdrew.  This first step was 
accomplished by 31 August 1993. 
Lithuania, as the biggest of the Baltic countries, had more 
resources available to develop its armed forces during the 1990s. Nonetheless, it 
struggled to increase defense spending due to economic recession. 
Still, Lithuania was able to field a force numbering about 8,900; 
including (as of 1994) a 4,300-member army, 350-member navy, 250-member air force, 
and 4,000-member border guard. A coast guard, modeled on the United States Coast 
Guard, was also established. Additionally, there was a 12,000-member Home Guard 
force72 (similar to the volunteer formations in other Baltic countries).  
Since then, the Lithuanian Armed Forces have gradually 
developed; currently, Lithuania still has a conscript-based armed force consisting of 
11,000 personnel,73 of which the core is the 'Iron Wolf' Mechanized Infantry Brigade.74 
These numbers place it first in military size among the Baltic countries.  
                                                 
71 “History of the Lithuanian Armed Forces,” Ministry of National Defense of Lithuania website, 
http://www.kam.lt/armed_forces/history/ (accessed May 20, 2008). 
72 “Lithuania, National Security,” Library of Congress Country Studies website, 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field (DOCID+lt0028) (accessed May 20, 2008). 
73 “NATO – Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defense for 2006.” 
74 “Lithuanian Armed Forces,” Ministry of National Defense of Lithuania website, 
http://www.kam.lt/armed_forces (accessed May 20, 2008). 
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2)  Spending before NATO.  As the biggest Baltic country 
Lithuania also spent the most in the early 90’s - $90.6 million in 1993, but the spending  
dropped after 1993 to $48.9 million in 1994.  
After Lithuania joined the PfP program in 1994 the amount 
allocated for defense purposes increased steadily afterwards and reached almost $ 100 
million in 1997 – $98.2 million. 
 
Table 17.   Lithuania, amount of military expenditure in  million $ (2005) 1997 – 
2006 (From: SIPRI) 
 



























Lithuania faced the same economic restraints as Latvia and 









Table 18.   Lithuania, GDP growth % 1990 – 2006 (From: World Bank data) 
 







































































After joining the MAP process in 1999, Lithuania increased its 
military expenditure even further. It increased from $147 million to $242 million from 
1999 to 2000—an increase of 60.7%. In terms of GDP, military expenditures rose from 
0.9% to 1.4%.   
However, until 2004, when the Baltic countries joined NATO, 
Lithuania's highest commitment in terms of percent of GDP spent on military 
expenditures was 1.4% for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004.  
3) Spending after Joining NATO.  After accession to NATO, 
Lithuania decreased its military spending to 1.2% of GDP; this was also a decrease in 









Table 19.   Lithuania, military expenditure as % of GDP 1997 – 2006 (From: SIPRI) 
 





























6. Albania (Joins NATO 2009) 
In its short history Albania experienced several ups and downs—the country 
declared independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1912, but was re-conquered in 1939 
by Italy. Later, it was taken over by communist partisans in 1944 and became a member 
of the Eastern bloc after that.  
Once established, Albania’s governing communist regime was very xenophobic. 
It allied first with the USSR (until 1960, when Albania left the Warsaw Pact), and 
thereafter with China (until 1978).  
Albania finally opened to other countries in the 1990s and started a transition to a 
democratic society, but the transformation was a hard one as successive governments 
have tried to deal with high unemployment, widespread corruption, powerful organized 




                                                 
75 “Albania Fact Book,” CIA website, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/al.html (accessed May 20, 2008). 
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Table 20.   Albania, GDP growth % 1990 – 2006 (From: World Bank data) 
 






































































Albania first requested to join NATO in 1992, immediately after the country’s 
first multiparty elections, and since then continued to develop and expand relations with 
NATO member countries.   
Albania stayed mostly neutral during the Yugoslavian wars in the Balkans in the 
1990s, though Albanian forces did join the NATO-led SFOR peacekeeping force in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996. The cooperation with NATO went further in 1999, 
when NATO established a logistical base in Tirana to support Allied operations in 
Kosovo;76  in 2002, this was transformed into NATO Headquarters in Tirana.77 
Albania joined NATO’s ‘Partnership for Peace Initiative’ in February 1994, and is 
a member of the ‘US-Adriatic Charter of Partnership’ (signed in Tirana in 2003).78 
Albania entered MAP in 1999 and was officially invited to join NATO during the 
Bucharest summit on April 2-4, 2008.79 
                                                 
76 “NATO’s Relations with Albania,” NATO website, 
http://www.nato.int/issues/nato_albania/evolution.html (accessed May 20, 2008). 
77 “NATO Headquarters Tirana,” NATO Headquarters Tirana website, 
http://www.afsouth.nato.int/organization/NHQTIRANA/index.htm (accessed May 20, 2008). 
78  Milica Delevic, ”Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans,” Chaillot Paper no. 104 (Paris: EU 
Institute for Security Studies, 2007). 
79 “NATO Decision on Open Door Policy,” NATO website, http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/04-
april/e0403h.html (accessed May 20, 2008). 
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a.  Background Information on the Armed Forces of Albania 
During the years of the Cold War, Albania tried to isolate itself from the 
rest of the world and relied on its own capabilities to defend itself. In 1992, the total 
number of the Albanian armed forces was estimated to be 48,000 men, of which 50% 
were conscripts. The force structure was copied from the Red Army model, with 
realignment to the Chinese model after 1961.80 
Albania struggled economically during the 1990s, but continued to sustain 
high numbers of military personnel due to the Yugoslavian wars raging in neighboring 
countries. Only in 2002 did the Albanian military launch a ten-year transformation 
program under the guidance of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to trim down and 
thoroughly modernize its current standing force of more than 30,000 troops. The 
Albanian army participates in the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Afghanistan and 
Iraq. The total strength of the armed forces is estimated currently at 21,500.81 
b.  Spending Before NATO 
According to SIPRI, data Albania spent 5.9% of the GDP ($227 million) 
on military expenditure in 1990. Due to its very hard transition to a market economy, –
that number fell sharply thereafter. For example, when Albania joined PfP in 1994, it 
spent 2.5% of GDP ($108 million) – half as much as before. In 1999, when Albania 
joined MAP, the number was down to 1.2% of GDP ($69 million)—less than one third 
the 1990 amount.  
PfP and MAP were very helpful to the country in order to assign priorities 
and better spend its limited funds in order to come closer to NATO membership.  
                                                 
80 “Albania, National Security,” Library of Congress Country Studies website, 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+al0156) (accessed May 20, 2008). 
81 “Albania Armed Forces,” The Centre for South East European Studies website, 
http://www.csees.net/?page=country_section&country_id=1&sec=8 (accessed May 20, 2008). 
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Albania itself saw its membership in NATO as an opportunity to spread 
NATO’s influence in southeastern Europe. In its MAP, Albania is focusing on the 
following priorities: 
• Continue to improve public order and market economy, giving special 
attention to the improvement of public order and the fight against 
corruption  
• Encourage and develop respect for human rights, including minority rights  
• Strengthen democratic institutions and their role in society. Establish an 
efficient public administration  
• Strengthen civilian democratic control over the armed forces  
• Maintain the results achieved in growing the economy and continue 
economic reforms, particularly in the field of privatization   
• Continue ”good neighbor” policies—particularly in the context of the 
situation after Kosovo—making use of regional programs of the Stability 
Pact  
• Adapt legislation to make it more compatible with NATO Standards  
• Be fully engaged to guarantee internal control of weapons and 
disarmament process82 
 
c.  Spending in the Last Five Years Before Invitation to Join NATO 
In the last five years, Albania has gradually increased its military 
expenditure, from 1.2% of GDP in 1999 to 1.52% of GDP in 2006.  
The increase in terms of GDP percentage is not significant, but in fiscal 
terms it is—from $69 million to $139 million in 2006. 
2006 will be the first year when military expenditure will be higher than 




                                                 
82 “Albanian Defense Reform Priorities,” Albanian MoD website, 
http://www.mod.gov.al/index.php?crd=0,0,0,0,0,1,Lng2 (accessed May 20, 2008). 
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Table 21.   Albania , military expenditure as % of GDP 1997 – 2006 (From: SIPRI) 
 



























In addition, the complicated security situation in the Balkans must be 
taken into account when evaluating Albania’s economic development—only since 1998 
has Albania’s GDP grown in each successive year. 
 
Table 22.   Albania, amount of military expenditure  in million $ (2005) 1997 – 2006 
(From: SIPRI) 
 



























7. Croatia (Joins NATO 2009) 
Croatia—like other Balkan countries—has a complicated history in the 20th 
century. At first, it was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until the end of the World 
 50
War I; it then became a part of the Yugoslavian kingdom, together with Serbs and 
Slovenes. After the Second World War, Yugoslavia (including Croatia) became an 
independent communist country under the Tito regime. This unification lasted into the 
early 1990s (1991), when Croatia finally declared its independence. 
However, the Serbs who lived in Croatia did not want Croatia to part from 
Yugoslavia and they started a rebellion supported by the Yugoslav People’s Army (which 
was controlled by the Serbs). It took four years for Croatia to win the struggle for its 
independence, before occupying Serb armies were cleared from the territory of Croatia. 
Under UN supervision, the last Serb-held enclave in eastern Slavonia was returned to 
Croatia in 1998.83  
After that, Croatia focused on development of its economy, which was heavily 
damaged during the early 1990s and experienced growth only after 1995. At the same 
time, Croatia paid attention to the transformation of its armed forces within the 
frameworks and tools offered by NATO.84  
Since declaration of independence, Croatia has established relations with NATO 
and joined the PfP process in 2000 (after a six-year expanding relationship from 1994) 
and the MAP process in 2002. Croatia was invited—together with Albania—to join 










                                                 
83 “Croatia Fact Book,” CIA website, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/hr.html (accessed May 20, 2008). 
84 Lionel Beehner, “NATO Looks to Expand Mission and Membership,” Council of Foreign Relations 
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85 “NATO’s Relations with Croatia,” NATO website, 
http://www.nato.int/issues/nato_croatia/index.html (accessed May 20, 2008). 
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Table 23.   Croatia, GDP growth % 1990 – 2006 
 


































































a.  Background Information on the Armed Forces of Croatia 
After declaring independence, Croatia needed to establish its armed forces 
from scratch—and the young country needed them right from the beginning as it fought a 
four-year war of independence.86  
In the mid 1990s it was estimated that Croatia had 180,000 men in its 
armed forces.87 By 2002, this number was down to 51,000 active military personnel and 
140,000 reserves.88   
According to the latest plans, the Croatian Armed Forces should be 16,000 
(they are currently at 25,000) strong within the NATO framework,89 as Croatia has 
transitioned to a professional military starting from January 1, 2008.   
 
 
                                                 
86 Davor Bozinovic, “Transforming Society – Croatia’s Way to NATO,” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 
website, http://www.kas.de/proj/home/pub/40/16/dokument_id-11948/index.html (accessed May 20, 2008). 
87 Bozinovic, “Transforming Society – Croatia’s Way to NATO.” 
88 “Croatian Armed Forces,” Encyclopedia of Nations website, 
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Europe/Croatia-ARMED-FORCES.html (accessed May 20, 2008). 
89 Bozinovic, “Transforming Society – Croatia’s Way to NATO.” 
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Croatia has also been contributing to the peacekeeping efforts in 
Afghanistan since 2003. It also actively cooperates with other Adriatic countries in the 
military field, including deployment of a joint medical unit (together with Albania and 
FYROM) to Afghanistan.90  
b.  Spending Before NATO 
In the five years before joining the MAP in 2002, Croatia’s military 
expenditure decreased significantly; this can mostly be attributed to the end of the 
hostilities between Croatia and Serbia. Therefore, Croatia was able to focus more on the 
development of the economy than on transformation of its armed forces in the PfP and 
MAP framework. 
 
Table 24.   Croatia, military expenditure as % of GDP 1997 – 2006 (From: SIPRI) 
 

























During the war, Croatia spent more then five percent of GDP on military 
expenditure (as much as 9.4% of GDP in 1995—$2.24 billion). It then decreased from 
5.7% of GDP in 1997 to 2.4% of GDP in 2002, when Croatia joined the MAP process.  
 
 
                                                 
90 Bozinovic, “Transforming Society – Croatia’s Way to NATO.” 
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The military expenditure share of GDP continued to decrease further; 
according to SIPRI data it was only 1.6% of GDP in 2005. At the same time, military 
expenditure also decreased in fiscal terms—from $1.55 billion in 1997 to $684 million in 
2006. 
 
Table 25.   Croatia, amount of military expenditure in million $ (2005) 1997 – 2006 
(From: SIPRI) 
 
 Croatia ME in $(2005,millions)
1559 1570
1231






















8. FYROM (Macedonia) 
FYROM gained independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 in a peaceful way and 
mostly was preserved from hostilities during the 1990s (unlike the other former 
Yugoslavian republics).   
Therefore, FYROM’s economy was not damaged as much as the economies of 
other countries during the early 1990s, suffering only one-digit decreases in the GDP in 
each successive year. It showed a steady rate of growth in the mid 1990s, then noted a 
steady decline in 2001 (probably caused by the insurgency in the country).  
This was the biggest challenge to the young country, when the Albanian minority 
in the country started an insurgency in order to have equal rights with the Macedonians. 
NATO needed to step in and end the fighting.91  
                                                 
91 “FYROM Fact Book,” CIA website, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/mk.html (accessed May 20, 2008). 
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Another controversy is that Greece refuses to recognize the country under its 
current official name (the U.S. has referred to the country as the Republic of Macedonia 
since 2004);92 these tensions prevented the country receiving an invitation to join NATO 
together with Croatia and Albania in April 2008.93  
 
Table 26.   FYROM, GDP growth % 1991 – 2006 







































































a.  Background Information on the Armed Forces of FYROM 
When FYROM declared its independence in 1991, its armed forces 
consisted simply of local militia and old equipment left by the Yugoslav People’s Army.  
In 1992, the Armed Forces of the Macedonian Republic were formed.    
FYROM was not involved in the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, and 
therefore the build up of the armed forces was slower than in other former Yugoslavian 
republics. 
                                                 
92 “FYROM Fact Book.”  
93 “Greece Refuses FYROM's NATO Accession Bid,” Embassy of Greece in U.S. website, 
http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=19&article=23096 
(accessed May 20, 2008). 
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Under the last reforms in the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces, 
the total military strength is 12,858 soldiers, of whom 70% are professional soldiers.94 
b.  Military Expenditure in the Last Ten Years 
As mentioned before, FYROM has not experienced the same problems 
(military hostilities) as its neighboring countries, except for an insurgency in 2001. 
Therefore, the country was able to gradually increase its military spending 
during the late 1990s—especially when FYROM joined the MAP process in 1999. Since 
then, military expenditure has slowly increased, as FYROM has declared NATO 
membership to be one of the country’s foreign policy priorities.  
 
Table 27.   FYROM, military expenditure as % of GDP 1997 – 2006 (From: SIPRI) 
 

























In fiscal terms, spending was and is relatively small compared to other 
new NATO member countries; FYROM spent $63 million on its military in 1997 and 
topped the $100 million mark in 2004.  
 
 
                                                 
94 “Organization of Armed Forces,” Ministry of Defense FYROM website, 
http://www.morm.gov.mk:8080/morm/en/ARM/Organization.html (accessed May 20, 2008). 
 56
Table 28.   FYROM, amount of military expenditure in million $ (2005) 1997 – 2006 
(From: SIPRI) 
 
 FYROM ME in $(2005,millions)
97.2 101 88.8 102
325



















9. Summary  
Some basic conclusions can be drawn and attributed to all countries which wanted 
to enter NATO after the end of the Cold War:  
• All needed to modernize and develop their militaries  
• Modernization and development efforts of the armed forces were 
hampered by economic decline at the start of the 1990s, as countries 
underwent a transition from planned to market economies 
The following conclusions relate to specific country groups: 
a. Countries Independent Prior to 1990 
• Countries that had larger armed forces and were independent during the 
Cold War (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Albania) drastically 
decreased military expenditure in the early-to-mid 1990s. 
• Increased military spending at latter stages was due to the need to meet 
NATO requirements 
• Once accepted and entered into NATO, military expenditure decreased    





b. Baltic Countries 
• After regaining independence in 1990, the Baltic countries started to 
increase their military spending gradually 
• After the invitation to join NATO was received and countries joined 
NATO, they stopped increasing their military spending, and even 
decreased it 
c. Adriatic Countries (Croatia, FYROM, except Albania) 
• Both countries spent significant amounts of GDP on development of the 
armed forces in the early 1990s, as they were involved in hostilities with 
their former Yugoslavian compatriots or had ethnic insurgencies within 
their territories 
• After the end of hostilities, military expenditures were cut drastically, and 
fell way below 2% of GDP mark for Croatia 
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A. GDP COMPARISONS 
 In order to analyze the budgetary behavior of the three accession wave countries, 
it will first be determined if any common trends exist in the economic development of 
each of these country groups which joined NATO at different times: the Visegrad 
countries95 (Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary) in 1999, Baltic countries (Latvia, 
Estonia and Lithuania) in 2004 and Adriatic countries (Albania, Croatia and FYROM96) 
which are part of the third prospective enlargement wave. 
1. Visegrad Countries  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, all three countries share a similar history; 
all three came into the Soviet sphere of influence after World War II and only in the 
1990s started their long road toward market economies and democracy. Therefore, as 
mentioned before, economic growth of the countries was slow in the early to mid 1990s. 
As can be seen, the correlation coefficient is over 0.7, which means that the 
economic development of the countries can be characterized as having a strong positive 
relationship; they are all neighboring (regionally) countries, with the same economic 







                                                 
95 “Visegrad Group,” Visegrad group website, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=925, 
(accessed May 20, 2008). 
96 FYROM was not invited to join NATO in 2009. 
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* - no data on 1990 GDP growth (annual %) for Czech Republic and Poland 
 
 
Table 30.   Correlation analysis of Visegrad country GDP growth (annual %) 
 








Poland GDP growth 
(annual %) 
Czech Republic GDP 
growth (annual %) 
1   
 Hungary GDP growth 
(annual %) 
0.77 1  





2. Baltic Countries  
As with the Visegrad countries, the Baltic countries share a similar historical 
background and faced the same difficulties in the 1990s. Therefore, it is possible to see 
that all countries experienced similar economic development problems.  
 
 
  Czech Republic GDP 
growth (annual %) 
 Hungary GDP 
growth (annual %) 
Poland GDP growth 
(annual %) 
1990  … -3 …  
1991 -12 -12 -7 
1992 -1 -3 3 
1993 0 -1 4 
1994 2 3 5 
1995 6 1 7 
1996 4 1 6 
1997 -1 5 7 
1998 -1 5 5 
1999 1 4 5 
2000 4 5 4 
2001 2 4 1 
2002 2 4 1 
2003 4 4 4 
2004 5 5 5 
2005 6 4 4 
2006 6 4 6 
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Table 31.   Baltic countries GDP growth (annual %) (From: World Bank) 
  Latvia GDP growth 
(annual %) 
Estonia GDP growth 
(annual %) 
Lithuania GDP growth 
(annual %) 
1990 -8 -7  … 
1991 -13 -8 -6 
1992 -32 -21 -21 
1993 -5 -6 -16 
1994 2 -2 -10 
1995 -1 5 3 
1996 4 4 5 
1997 8 11 7 
1998 5 4 7 
1999 5 0 -2 
2000 7 8 4 
2001 8 8 7 
2002 6 8 7 
2003 7 7 10 
2004 9 8 7 
2005 11 10 8 
2006 12 11 8 
* - no data on 1990 GDP growth (annual %) for Lithuania 
 
 When conducting the correlation analysis, it is possible to see that the economic 
development of the Baltic countries is even more closely linked than the economic 
development of the Visegrad countries, with a positive correlation coefficient ranging 
from 0.83 to 0.95. 
 
Table 32.   Correlation analysis of Baltic country GDP growth (annual %) 









growth (annual %) 
Latvia GDP growth (annual %) 1   
Estonia GDP growth (annual 
%) 
0.95 1  





3. Adriatic Countries  
 As with the previous groups, these countries share a similar past and traveled the 
same road to market economy and democracy, but there are several unknown factors in 
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this comparison—isolationist politics of Albania, Yugoslavian war factors—which could 
cause a lower linear relationship among these countries.  
 
Table 33.   Adriatic countries GDP growth (annual %) (From: World Bank) 
  Albania GDP growth 
(annual %) 
FYROM GDP growth 
(annual %) 
 Croatia GDP growth 
(annual %) 
1990 -10  …  …
1991 -27 -6 -21
1992 -7 -7 -12
1993 10 -7 -8
1994 9 -2 6
1995 9 -1 7
1996 9 1 6
1997 -10 1 7
1998 13 3 3
1999 10 4 -1
2000 7 5 3
2001 7 -5 4
2002 3 1 6
2003 6 3 5
2004 6 4 4
2005 6 4 4
2006 5 3 5
* - no data on 1990 GDP growth (annual %) for FYROM and Croatia 
 
Therefore, there are no big surprises that the economic development differences 
for the countries are bigger; the relationship among the countries’ development is still 
positive, but much weaker than among the Visegrad and Baltic countries (only from 0.42 
to 0.66). 
 
























Albania GDP growth (annual %) 1   
FYROM GDP growth (annual %) 0.43 1  
 Croatia GDP growth (annual %) 0.67 0.65 1 
 63
4. Comparison of All Three Enlargement Country Groups’ Economic 
Development  
In order to compare all three groups of new NATO members as aspirant countries, 
averages per country group per year were used in order to determine if there was a linear 
relationship among these three country groups (taking into account that all countries were 
in the Soviet sphere of influence and faced similar challenges economically, or any other 
variables which limit the relationship among these countries). 
As can be seen from the data, the correlation coefficient is ranging from 0.62 to 
0.93 positive, meaning that there is a medium to strong positive linear relationship 
between the economic development  from 1990–2006 (in terms of annual GDP growth 
among these three country groups). Hence, the countries had similar economic 
circumstances in which they needed to balance their military expenditures (ME) with 
other necessities—the classic “butter or guns” problem. 
 
Table 35.   Visegrad, Baltic and Adriatic countries GDP growth (annual % on 
average) 












1990 -3.0 -10.0 -7.5 
1991 -10.3 -18.0 -9.0 
1992 -0.3 -8.7 -24.7 
1993 1.0 -1.7 -9.0 
1994 3.3 4.3 -3.3 
1995 4.7 5.0 2.3 
1996 3.7 5.3 4.3 
1997 3.7 -0.7 8.7 
1998 3.0 6.3 5.3 
1999 3.3 4.3 1.0 
2000 4.3 5.0 6.3 
2001 2.3 2.0 7.7 
2002 2.3 3.3 7.0 
2003 4.0 4.7 8.0 
2004 5.0 4.7 8.0 
2005 4.7 4.7 9.7 






Table 36.   Correlation analysis of Visegrad, Adriatic and Baltic country GDP growth 
(annual % in average) 



















Visegrad countries GDP growth (annual %) 
(Average) 
1   
Adriatic countries GDP growth (annual %) (Average) 0.94 1  
Baltic countries GDP growth (annual %) (Average) 0.62 0.71 1
 
B. MILITARY EXPENDITURE (ME) AS % OF GDP COMPARISON FIVE 
YEARS PRIOR AND AFTER NATO ENTRANCE 
 The second part of this analysis determines if there are any linear relationships in 
military expenditure among those three country groups internally, and then cross 
compares all three groups in order to identify any general trends among these countries 
five years prior to NATO accession/invitation to join NATO.  
It is assumed that there should be a common trend among these countries 
internally, as NATO membership is a prime foreign policy and military priority for all of 
these countries. 
 The five year comparison period is chosen because of the fact that the Visegrad 
countries joined PfP five years prior to accession to NATO (at that time, PfP was the 
major tool in order to synchronize aspirant countries to NATO requirements), the Baltic 
countries joined MAP five years prior to accession (MAP was specially established in 
order to accommodate the accession process of aspirant countries to NATO), and it 
would be impossible to use military expenditure data for a longer period in order to see 





1. Visegrad Countries 
In analyzing the Visegrad countries, it is possible to observe that only Poland and 
the Czech Republic sustain a commitment to ME at almost 2% of the GDP for most of 
the time.  For example, Poland reached its maximum commitment in 1998 (one year prior 
to NATO) and after that never spent more then 1.9% of GDP on ME.  
 Hungary only spent more than 2% of GDP on ME in 1994, and decreased its 
commitment until 1999; since then, Hungary has devoted more each year to ME.  The 
Czech Republic also reached its highest ME contribution in 1999, but still continued to 
commit almost 2% of GDP to ME.  
 
Table 37.   Visegrad countries ME as %of GDP (From: SIPRI) 
 Poland ME % of 
GDP 
Hungary ME % of 
GDP 
Czech Republic ME % of 
GDP 
1994 2.4 2.1 2.3 
1995 2 1.6 1.9 
1996 2 1.5 1.8 
1997 2 1.7 1.7 
1998 2 1.5 1.9 
1999 1.9 1.7 2 
2000 1.8 1.7 2 
2001 1.9 1.8 1.9 
 
 When looking at the Visegrad country group in general, it is possible to see that 
there is a medium-strong positive correlation among the countries concerning ME. 
 
Table 38.   Correlation analysis of Visegrad country ME as % of GDP 
  Poland ME % of 
GDP 
Hungary 
ME % of 
GDP 
Czech Republic 
ME % of GDP 
Poland ME % of GDP 1   
Hungary ME % of GDP 0.63 1  







2. Baltic Countries 
 The Baltic countries started their official accession in 1999 when they joined the 
MAP process. From the data, it is possible to observe that Baltic country ME share as 
percentage of GDP increased gradually and peaked in 2004, which was the year when all 
three countries joined NATO. After that, it is possible to note a decline in the ME 
commitment in all three countries.  
Table 39.   Baltic countries ME as % of GDP (From: SIPRI) 
 Latvia ME % of 
GDP 
Estonia ME % of 
GDP 
Lithuania ME % of 
GDP 
1999 0.8 1.3 0.9 
2000 0.9 1.4 1.4 
2001 1 1.5 1.3 
2002 1.6 1.7 1.4 
2003 1.7 1.8 1.4 
2004 1.7 1.8 1.4 
2005 1.7 1.5 1.2 
2006 1.53 1.37 1.12 
 
Analyzing the linear relationships in ME as % of GDP among the Baltic 
countries, it can be seen that there is a weak to strong positive relationship of ME as 
percentage of GDP among all three countries (from 0.41 to 0.71).  
 
Table 40.   Correlation analysis of Baltic country ME as % of GDP 
  Latvia ME % 
of GDP 
Estonia ME % 
of GDP 
Lithuania ME 
% of GDP 
Latvia ME % of GDP 1   
Estonia ME % of GDP 0.71 1  
Lithuania ME % of GDP 0.41 0.74 1
 
 
3. Adriatic Countries 
The Adriatic countries in this comparison form the least homogeneous group. 
Albania (joined the MAP process in 2002) was an independent country prior to 1990; on 
the other hand Croatia (joined PfP in 2000) fought a four-year war of independence 
versus Serbia from 1991 to 1994. 
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Also, the economic backgrounds of the countries were different, as Albania only 
recently (from 1990) opened itself to other countries.  
When comparing these three countries, of which two (Croatia and Albania) were 
invited to join NATO next year, it is possible to see differences in ME. For example, at 
the end of 1990s Croatia was decreasing its armed forces, but FYROM (joined MAP in 
1999) started to build them and coped with an insurgency in the country in 2001. 
 
Table 41.   Adriatic countries ME as % of GDP (From: SIPRI) 
 Albania ME % 
of GDP 
Croatia 
ME % of 
GDP 
FYROM ME % 
of GDP 
1999 1.2 4.3 1.8 
2000 1.2 3.0 1.9 
2001 1.3 2.6 6.6 
2002 1.3 2.4 2.8 
2003 1.4 2.1 2.5 
2004 1.4 1.7 2.5 
2005 1.4 1.6 2.2 
2006 1.5 1.6 1.95 
 
 
Therefore, it is no surprise that there is no positive linear relationship among these 
countries in military trends—the data is widely scattered.  
 
Table 42.   Correlation analysis of Adriatic country ME as % of GDP 
  Albania ME % of 
GDP 
Croatia 
ME % of 
GDP 
FYROM ME % 
of GDP 
Albania ME % of GDP 1   
Croatia ME % of GDP -0.86 1  
FYROM ME % of GDP -0.09 -0.02 1
 
 
4. Comparison of All Three Enlargement Groups’ Commitment to 
Military Expenditures in Terms of % of GDP 
 The first aspect of this data which draws attention is the gradual ME decrease 
trend among all countries after they enter NATO (an exception is the Visegrad countries, 
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but they still do not reach the ME level of 2% of GDP) which is an informal NATO 
requirement to the NATO member countries.97  
 
Table 43.   Adriatic, Visegrad and Baltic countries Average ME as % of GDP 
Adriatic countries average ME 
% of GDP 
Visegrad countries 
average ME % of GDP 
Baltic countries average 
ME % of GDP 
2.4 2.27 1.00 
2.0 1.83 1.23 
3.5 1.77 1.27 
2.2 1.80 1.57 
2.0 1.80 1.63 
1.9 1.87 1.63 
1.7 1.83 1.47 
1.7 1.87 1.34 
 
 
Evaluating any linear relationship among these country groups, it is determined 
that there is no positive correlation among these country groups on ME in the last decade. 
 
Table 44.   Correlation analysis of Visegrad, Adriatic and Baltic country ME in 
average as % of GDP 
  Adriatic 
countries 
average 










ME % of 
GDP 
Adriatic countries average ME % of GDP 1   
Visegrad countries average ME % of GDP 0.003 1  
Baltic countries average ME % of GDP -0.40 -0.67 1
 
 
As mentioned before, the data shows an alarming trend—two out of three country 
groups in the sample period showed a decrease of commitment to ME after 
accession/invitation to NATO.  
It could be attributed to the fact that they feel safe already in NATO (Baltic 
countries) or are close to becoming members of the largest military alliance in the world 
(Adriatic countries). 
                                                 
97 Carl Ek, “NATO’s Prague Capability Commitment,” Federation of American Scientists website, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21659.pdf (accessed May 20, 2008). 
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Other reasons could be that the countries that joined NATO or are close to joining 
the alliance are in the later stages of (or have finished) defense reforms; this allows for 
achievement of the same level of security as before, but with lesser funds. 
Still, the most significant fact is that none of the country groups in the test sample 
showed an increase of ME up to and over the NATO informal requirement of 2% of 
GDP. 
 
Table 45.   Visegrad, Baltic and Adriatic country ME as % of GDP 5 years before 
NATO accession and after accession/invitation to NATO 
Vishegrad, Baltic, Adriatic country ME % of GDP 5 years before 































C. COMPARISON OF COUNTRY GROUP MEAN ME TO ME=2%OF GDP 
 This chapter compared the means of all three country groups to the value of ME = 
2% of GDP, in order to determine if the countries on average were able to reach the 




1. Visegrad Country ME Comparison to ME = 2% of GDP  
When comparing the means on the difference in ME to ME=2% of GDP of the 
Visegrad country group it is possible to see that the mean ME is 0.131 lower than 2%; in 
this case it would mean that the countries in this sample time (five years before NATO 
accession and two years after that) were not spending the NATO required 2% of GDP on 
ME.   
 
Table 46.   Visegrad countries ME to 2% of GDP 
Visegrad countries t-Test 
    
  Variable 1   
Mean 1.88   
Variance 0.026   
Observations 8   
 
 
2. Baltic Country ME Comparison to ME = 2% of GDP 
 Analyzing the ME means for Baltic countries on the difference of the ME mean to 
2% of GDP, it is possible to see that the Baltic countries are doing even worse on average 
than the Visegrad countries. They spent only 1.39 % on ME on average during the 
sample time (five years prior to NATO accession and two years after it).  
 
Table 47.   Baltic countries ME to 2% of GDP 
Baltic countries t-Test 
    
  Variable 1   
Mean 1.39   
Variance 0.05   








3. Adriatic Country ME Comparison to ME = 2% of GDP 
When comparing the mean ME spending of the Adriatic countries to ME of 2%, 
the results were surprising, in that this group was the only one of the groups which spent 
more than 2% of GDP (on average) on ME. 
It is assumed that the Yugoslavian wars would have an impact on the levels on 
ME—Croatia spent well over 2% of GDP on ME until 2002 and FYROM faced an 
insurgency in 2001, which caused a rise in its ME to 6.1% of GDP. 
 
Table 48.   Adriatic country ME to 2% of GDP 
Adriatic countries t-Test 
    
  Variable 1   
Mean 2.18   
Variance 0.34   
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VIII. TRENDS IN ME BY CATEGORIES AFTER ACCESSION TO 
NATO  
 In analyzing the ME trends of the two enlargement country groups who are now 
NATO members, the author will try to find common expenditure patterns and evaluate if 
these patterns can be used to predict the spending trends of the third collective 
enlargement wave.  
A. NATO MEMBERS BEFORE ACCESSION TO NATO 
 Central and Eastern European countries have undergone major changes after the 
end of the Cold War, which also impacted their ME behavior and its spending 
breakdown. There was a shift away from the inherited Soviet-style armed forces (for the 
Visegrad countries), used during the Warsaw Pact era, to modern armed forces ready to 
jointly operate with other NATO armed forces.  
 It was widely acknowledged that these old-style armed forces were too large and 
that the countries (with their weak economies) could not afford them—the burden on the 
economies was just too big.98 On the other hand, the Baltic countries needed to establish 
their defense forces from scratch. This they did, mostly using the military infrastructure 
left by the Soviet Army.  
In the beginning and in the mid 1990s, the Visegrad countries made large cuts to 
ME (basically halving expenditures from their Cold War levels). Also, similar and even 
more drastic cuts were applied to the military personnel numbers as major procurement 
programs were stopped and training levels decreased.99  The story was quite different for 
the Baltic countries—there was simply nothing there to cut, as these countries had only 
recently regained their independence.  
 
                                                 
98 “Military Matter, Beyond Prague,” NATO website, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue3/english/military.html#, (accessed May 20, 2008). 
99 Ibid. 
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These reforms, of course, were not easy. The issue was always there: butter or 
guns. As countries struggled economically, there was an internal fight for the scarce 
funds among services and spending categories within the military budgets. 
 Therefore, it is possible to argue that accepting the Central and Eastern European 
countries to NATO was more a political than a capabilities based decision and  
…while there is broad political support for the United States' war on 
terrorism, the absence of direct and immediate threats to the Central and 
Eastern European states suggests that more dramatic increases in defense 
spending are unlikely in future and Central and Eastern European 
governments face the difficult task of reconciling their limited resources 
available for defense with their commitment to participate in international 
peace-support operations, the declining operational effectiveness of the 
bulk of the armed forces and postponed procurement decisions.100  
This could result in a delay in development of the national armed forces, and 
reliance on NATO in cases of emergencies. 
Of course, these countries have contributed their share to NATO international 
operations (and done well), in particular the NATO-led operations in the Balkans.  
Central and Eastern European forces that have participated in these 
operations have generally performed well and have gradually taken on 
more demanding roles. Participation in these operations has contributed to 
the professionalization of the participating units. It may also have a 
positive trickle-down effect on the countries' armed forces more broadly, 
as soldiers are rotated into and out of the operations.101  
Most of the post-communist Central and Eastern European countries found out 
that the defense transformation was more difficult and also slower than was expected 
when these reforms started, and additional reforms were required after joining NATO. 
Tools provided by NATO (PfP and MAP) were useful to streamline the 
transformation processes and to show weakness which should be improved in order to 
enhance the new NATO members’ capabilities.  
                                                 
100 “Military Matter, Beyond Prague.” 
101 Ibid. 
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Involvement of the new NATO members in NATO defense planning with the 
adoption of the new Strategic Concept (which launched the Defense Capabilities 
Initiative that resulted in the force goals) also put additional stress on the modernization 
issues of the armed forces and increase of their rapid reaction time and mobility. 
In the Visegrad countries, the manpower reductions in the early 1990s were not 
followed by similar cuts in assets (for example, the Polish armed forces were still using  
high-maintenance equipment and munitions of little military and training value, such as 
T-55 tanks and 100 mm shells).102  
Another problem for the armed forces were the large stockpiles of obsolete 
weapons which needed to be monitored; therefore; the governments tried to sell these 
stockpiles, but generated funds have been usually much lower than predicted.   
In order to use the funds more effectively, Central and Eastern European countries 
are starting to evaluate changes to the procurement procedures and use of outsourcing 
services to the private sector.103 
B. NEW NATO MEMBER SPENDING PATTERNS 
1. Spending on Personnel 
As mentioned before, the end of the Cold War left the Visegrad countries with 
large armed forces which they were not able to sustain. There already have been reforms 
in place to cut the personnel number significantly prior to NATO membership, but as can 
be seen from the sample data Poland (which had the largest armed forces of these three 
countries) is still cutting funds for personnel.  
The Czech Republic, after initial cuts at the start of this millennium, increased the 
personnel expenditure, then decreased and again is committing more funds for personnel. 
There is no common trend in these activities.   
                                                 
102 “Military Matter, Beyond Prague.” 
103 Ibid. 
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The same can be said for Hungary (which had the smallest armed forces of these 
three countries)—expenditures were cut, and then increased again. 
 
Table 49.   Visegrad, Baltic country Personnel expenditure as % of total ME (From: 
NATO) 
 Personnel expenditure in % of total ME 
 Poland Czech Republic Hungary Latvia Estonia Lithuania 
1999 62.4 46.9 46.7    
2000 62.3 42.8 48.7    
2001 64.3 46 47.9    
2002 64.9 45.5 48.7    
2003 64.6 41.9 41.9    
2004 60.6 51.1 49.4 43.8 32.8 51.1 
2005 57.3 47.2 48.1 49.8 29.2 58.2 
2006 53.8 47.4 51.2 39.2 26 54.8 
2007e 52.1 48.4 52.5 33.2 26.2 54.5 
 
 
The Baltic countries: they have only been members of NATO for four years. 
Therefore it is hard to predict future personnel spending trends, but it is possible to 
observe an increase in military personnel pay for Latvia and Lithuania in 2005. 
Otherwise, it could be said that the trend is toward a decrease in personnel costs as a 
percentage of ME.  
 
Table 50.   Visegrad, Baltic country Personnel expenditure as% of total ME (From: 
NATO) 
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2. Spending on Equipment 
Analyzing this spending category, the trend for the Baltic countries is clear: 
spending has increased each year (5% for Latvia over the last four years, 5% for Estonia 
and 7% for Lithuania).  
 
Table 51.   Visegrad, Baltic country Equipment expenditure as % of total ME (From: 
NATO) 
 Equipment expenditure in % of total ME 
 Poland Czech Republic Hungary Latvia Estonia Lithuania 
1999 11.1 16.3 21    
2000 8.8 22.5 12.4    
2001 8.8 20.3 10.5    
2002 11.1 17.5 11.1    
2003 12.4 19.5 10.3    
2004 14.6 15.4 11.9 7.4 12.6 12.3 
2005 14.6 9.3 8.4 8.7 11.9 15.3 
2006 18.2 14.6 9 12.3 14.5 17 
2007e 24 14.6 13.2 12.6 17.6 19.1 
 
Among the Visegrad countries, only in the case of Poland is it possible to see a 
continuous increase in ME on Equipment; the percentage has more than doubled over the 
last nine years.  
The data shows no trends for the Czech Republic and Hungary. ME levels are 










Table 52.   Visegrad, Baltic country Equipment expenditure as % of total ME (From: 
NATO) 
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3. Spending on Infrastructure 
Analyzing the Visegrad countries’ infrastructure spending, it is possible to 
observe that Poland has increased its infrastructure spending amount three times during 
the last nine years; the Czech Republic and Hungary have also increased their spending 
levels.  
 
Table 53.   Visegrad, Baltic country Infrastructure expenditure as % of total ME 
(From: NATO) 
 Infrastructure expenditure in % of total ME 
 Poland Czech Republic Hungary Latvia Estonia Lithuania 
1999 1.4 7.1 4    
2000 1.9 3.3 2.9    
2001 2.2 4.6 5.7    
2002 1.7 6.1 6.4    
2003 2.1 4.2 6.6    
2004 3.8 5.8 7 14.8 13.6 3.8 
2005 5.4 6.9 4.6 11.1 19 4.4 
2006 3.8 8.3 8.1 9.7 16.4 3.5 
2007e 4.3 8.5 5.3 15.1 15.5 3.1 
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When looking at infrastructure spending data for the Baltic countries, it can be 
seen that Lithuanian spending is different from that of Latvia and Estonia. This could 
lead to a conclusion that development of infrastructure is not as high a priority for 
Lithuania as for the other Baltic countries (both Latvia and Estonia have slight increases 
in this expenditure over the last four years).  
 
Table 54.   Visegrad, Baltic country Infrastructure expenditure as % of total ME 
(From: NATO) 
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4. Spending on Other Expenditure (Expenditures not Covered in Other 
Categories: Transportation, Communications, Administrative 
Expenditures) 
In the last nine years, Poland has decreased its ME on other expenditures, from 
25.1% in 1999 to 19.6% in 2007. On the other hand, it is possible to see that Hungary and 
the Czech Republic have kept funding levels for other expenses at the same level for the 
last nine years. 
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Table 55.   Visegrad, Baltic country Other expenditure in % of total ME (From: 
NATO) 
 Other expenditure in % of total ME 
 Poland Czech Republic Hungary Latvia Estonia Lithuania 
1999 25.1 29.8 28.3    
2000 27.1 31.5 36.1    
2001 24.6 29.1 35.9    
2002 22.3 30.9 33.2    
2003 20.9 34.4 34.3    
2004 21.1 27.7 31.7 34 40.9 32.8 
2005 22.7 36.6 38.8 30.4 39.9 22.2 
2006 24.2 29.7 31.7 38.8 43.2 24.6 
2007e 19.6 28.6 28.9 39.2 40.8 23.3 
 
In analyzing the Baltic states’ spending in the other expenses category, it is not 
possible to see any common trends in the data; Latvia has increased its commitment, 
Estonian spending levels are stable and have not changed, and Lithuania has decreased its 
commitment from 32.8% to 23.3%. 
 
Table 56.   Visegrad, Baltic country Other expenditure in % of total ME (From: 
NATO) 
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Conclusions will be divided into the following sections: general observations, t-
test of mean analysis of ME commitment data to 2% of GDP level, GDP correlations 
results, ME level relationships, and analysis of patterns and spending trends by category. 
A. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
1. The promise to join NATO has an impact on a country’s ME level—it 
increases up to the membership point, and then starts to decrease. 
2. None of the country groups who joined NATO—the Visegrad and Baltic 
countries—on average reached the NATO informal level of ME as 2% of 
GDP. 
3. Tools provided by NATO to aspirant countries (PfP and MAP) were 
useful in order to prepare the countries for full fledged NATO 
membership. 
4. NATO is slowly converting from a military (capabilities based) alliance 
into a political alliance, as the commitment levels to ME in these countries 
are below NATO’s requirement of 2% of GDP. 
 B. NEW NATO MEMBER AND NATO INVITEE ME MEAN COMPARISON 
TO ME AS 2% OF GDP 
1. For the Visegrad countries, it is possible to see that the mean ME is 0.131 
lower then 2%. 
2. For the Baltic countries, the difference from the NATO requirement is 
even bigger; they spent only 1.39% on ME, on average, during the sample 
time. 
3. For the Adriatic countries, the results were surprising; this group was the 
only one of the groups which spent more than 2% of GDP on ME, on 
average.  
C. NEW NATO MEMBER AND NATO INVITEE GDP CHANGE IN 
PERCENT CORRELATION 
1. The Visegrad countries’ economic development can be characterized as 
having a strong positive relationship—the correlation coefficient is over 
0.7. 
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2. Economic development of the Baltic countries is even closer—the 
correlation coefficient ranges from 0.83 to 0.95 positive. 
3. The Adriatic countries’ economic development has a weaker relationship, 
but is still positive (0.42 to 0.66). 
4. In cross comparison, the economic development of all three country 
groups has a medium to strong positive relationship (from 0.62 to 0.93). 
D. NEW NATO MEMBER AND NATO INVITEE ME AS % OF GDP 
RELATIONSHIPS  
1. ME expenditure levels for the Visegrad countries have a medium to strong 
(0.59 – 0.75) positive relationship. 
2. The Baltic countries’ ME has a weak to strong positive relationship (from 
0.41 to 0.71). 
3. The Adriatic country ME levels have no positive linear relationship—the 
data is widely scattered. 
4. Cross comparing all three groups, it is clear that there is no positive 
relationship in ME levels as % of GDP.  
5. There is an alarming trend—two out of three country groups in the sample 
period showed a decrease of commitment to ME after accession/invitation 
to NATO.  
E. NEW NATO MEMBER ME SPENDING CATEGORY TRENDS AND 
PATTERNS 
1. Personnel expenditure – Poland is still cutting funds for personnel. The 
Czech Republic and Hungary show no pattern in personnel expenditure. 
The Baltic countries (except Latvia and Lithuania in 2005) show a 
decrease of personnel costs as percentage of ME.  
2. Equipment expenditure – The Baltic countries are increasing spending 
year by year, as is Poland; the spending percentage has more than doubled 
over the last nine years. For the Czech Republic and Hungary, there is no 
trend in the data. 
3. Infrastructure expenditure - Poland has increased its infrastructure 
spending three times during the last nine years, as have the Czech 
Republic and Hungary. Lithuanian spending is different from that of 
Latvia and Estonia, which could lead to the conclusion that infrastructure 
development is not as much of a priority as it is in the other Baltic 
countries.  
4. Other expenses expenditure - Poland has decreased its ME on other 
expenses (from 25.1% in 1999 to 19.6% in 2007). Hungary and the Czech 
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Republic have kept funding at the same level for the last nine years. The 
Baltic countries show no common trends in their spending. 
5. It is hard to predict future spending trends for the Adriatic countries based 
on the analysis of data for the previous enlargement wave countries, as the 
remains of the previous regimes (Albania) are different in each of the 
Adriatic countries and they had different paths to independence (FYROM 
and Croatia). 
6. The only prediction which could be made by spending categories is that 
Equipment expenditure will become bigger in the future as modern 
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